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Abstract
This paper attempts to explain the puzzle of low and variable
qualities in seemingly competitive markets. We show that under cost
or demand uncertainty in a market with free entry, reputation nay not
be sufficient to solve the problem of asymmetric information. Since
markets with a multiplicity of producers are more likely to suffer from
cost and demand uncertainties, they are also more susceptible to
suffering from quality problems as well. The derived conditions for the
persistence of quality problems furthermore contribute to the
explanation of quality differences between similar markets in developed
and less developed countries.

REPUTATION AND UNCERTAINTY: TOWARDS AN
EXPLANATION OF QUALITY PROBLEMS IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS
I. Introduction
Markets with imperfect information have a potential for failure.
For example, in markets where product quality is not observable at the
time of purchase, sellers have an incentive to sell 'lemons' in place
of more costly high quality products. However, institutions such as
reputation often appear in these markets and generate proper incen-
tives for the maintenance of preferred quality levels. Sellers who
forego the benefits of cheating earn a reputation which allows them to
charge a premium over the cost of production. This premium is the
cost of correcting the information problem in the marketplace, and
buyers should be willing to pay for it if they prefer quality products
(Klein and Leffier, 1981). In a competitive market, the quality pre-
mium may alternatively be interpreted as the return on investment in
reputation (Shapiro, 1983).
Despite these apparent possibilities of correcting information
problems at a cost, there are many markets which persistently suffer
from variable and poor quality, without the market failing altogether
or market institutions such as reputation solving the problem. Rashid
(1985) provides an interesting documentation of several such cases,
ranging from the non-uniform quality cloth in the pre-Industrial
Revolution England to the diluted milk and pebble-blended rice in the
contemporary less developed countries. A notable common character-
istic of the cases examined by Rashid is that they are all markets
with a multiplicity of small producers and with free entry. This
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observation is quite puzzling, since these characteristics are often
associated with perfect competition where one expects consumer
sovereignty. Low quality in some markets may of course be due to low
consumer incomes and their preferences. However, in most of Rashid's
examples this is unlikely to be the case. In the milk market, for
example, it is not at all clear why consumers would want to buy
diluted milk, while they can add water to the pure milk themselves;
the cleanness of the process is going to be more certain and the cost
may even be lower. Similarly, consumers' complaints about cheating
and about variability of quality are also hard to explain on the basis
of preferences [1].
Akerlof (1970) who has been puzzled by his observations of quality
problems in India, seems to suggest that scarcity of entreprenuerial
skills may prevent LDC producers from building up reputation and
capitalizing on honesty. It is, however, rather difficult to believe
that the pursuit of simple rules of honesty should require greater
skills than the maintenance of a business based on repeated cheatings.
Moreover, it seems natural that consumers should punish dishonest
sellers by not buying, and reward the honest ones by showing a willing-
ness to pay for quality. This should instinctively teach the value of
reputation to the sellers. It is true that such mechanisms may not
work where consumers cannot identify the sellers or do not make
repeated purchases , but this is obviously not the case in the type of
markets that have puzzled us. The question, thus, remains why despite
strong incentives, reputation does not take root in these markets, and
if it fails, why these markets do not produce the (uniform) lowest
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possible qualities only, and why their qualities tend to vary from
time to time and from seller to seller.
Persistent quality problems may of course have sociological ex-
planations where consumers are not quite rational and stand to lose as
a result. For example, in choosing where to buy, consumers may be
motivated by advertising (Schmalensee , 1978) or by market shares
(Smallwood and Conlisk, 1979). While there may be some truth in these
assumptions, it is hard to believe that in the long run consumers
concentrate on gathering such information as opposed to the more rele-
vant ones; e.g., the sellers' past performance and their incentives to
maintain quality.
Quality problems may also persist if a group of consumers fails to
gather information about sellers' reputations, and thus falls victim
to the dishonest ones (Salop and Stiglitz, 1977; Grossman and
Stiglitz, 1980; Chan and Leland, 1982; Cooper and Ross, 1984; Schwartz
and Wilde, 1985). In this class of models with asymmetric informa-
tion, there is always an informed group of consumers that supports the
business of honest sellers and keeps the market for the high quality
products functioning. Uninformed consumers, on the other hand, find
information gathering too costly and, thus, act as free-riders while
running the risk of ending up with low quality products. These
models, although useful for other purposes, are not well equipped for
explaining the type of quality problems we are considering here. In
particular, the assumed dichotomy between consumers seems quite
strong: while one group of consumers is well informed and, thus, is
never cheated, the other groups who remain uninformed—by choice or by
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inherent handicaps—are the only potential preys for the dishonest
sellers.
Our purpose in this paper is to explore possible explanations of
persistent quality problems in markets with asymmetric information.
We argue, in Section III, that in the presence of cost uncertainty in
a competitive market, sellers may not find it worthwhile to maintain
their reputations. This can give rise to variability of product
quality and also discourage risk-averse consumers from paying a high
price for a high quality. We will show that the characteristics of
such markets match those of the problematic ones described by Rashid.
An extension of our main argument to the case of demand uncertainty in
monopolistically competitive markets and a generalization of our model
are provided in Section IV. Section V, at the end, summarizes the
paper. In the next section, we begin our discussion with a simple
model of reputation in order to describe the role of this institution
in correcting certain market failures, and to formulate our problem
more precisely. This model is a modified version of the example
analyzed by Shapiro (1983).
II. The Role of Reputation in Markets with Asymmetric Information
In order to see how reputation can help solve a potential market
failure, consider a product with quality characteristics that can be
observed only after purchase. In such a market, if quality is costly
to produce and if sellers are not identifiable, buyers have no eco-
nomic reason to expect anything but the lowest possible quality. Even
if they are willing to pay more for a higher quality and offer a
potential gain to the seller, they cannot expect the seller not to
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cheat. Therefore, the market for the high quality product fails to
exist, and many mutually beneficial transaction are blocked by the fact
that the buyers cannot trust the sellers. The main problem is that
sellers can cheat with impunity. However, if sellers are identifiable,
the problem may be solved by a combination of a premium profit for
quality and a boycott in case of cheating. A simple version of this
mechanism can be built in the following manner. Assume that in a
competitive market, a seller's reputation in each period, R , depends
only on the quality he has marketed in the previous period, q
_
,
[2]:
(I) \ = q^-i-
Also, assume that each seller produces one unit of the product in each
period, with the cost depending on quality. The cost function will be
represented by c(q), with c' > and c" >^ 0. Furthermore, assume that
there is a minimal quality q below which sellers cannot produce or
sell successfully. Similarly, there is an upper bound q which repre-
m
sents the maximum feasible quality.
If the price paid for quality q is p(q), the seller can earn
p(q) - c(q) as "pure" profits each period as long as he maintains
quality q. The seller chooses such a strategy if the expected present
value of profits over the life-time of his business is found to be
higher than all other alternative strategies. To keep the algebra
simple, instead of choosing a fixed life-time, we assume that there is
a probability e that the seller may leave the market at the end of
each period due to exogenous factors. Note that this implies an ex-
pected life-time of 1/e periods for the firm. Therefore, the expected
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present value of the quality-maintenance strategy, V (q), can be
calculated from:
(2) V^(q) = p(q) - c(q) + ( l-e)V^(q ) /( 1+r)
,
where r is the rate of interest. Equation (2) states that the present
value of the strategy M is equal to the profits made in the current
period plus the discounted expected value of the strategy at the end
of the period. Solving (2) for V. (q) results in:
M
(3) V„(q) = [p(q)-c(q)](l+r)/(r+e).
A seller with reputation q can earn V (q) = p(q) - c(q ) by
L* U
cheating in one period which gives him reputation q in the following
period and zero expected profits thereafter [3]. The seller will have
no incentive to cheat if V (q) _> V (q). It is easy to see that this
happens only when
(4) p(q) > c(q) + [c(q)-c(qQ)](r+e)/(l-e).
Inequality (4) puts a lower bound on the price of each quality, below
which the seller of that quality will prefer to milk his reputation.
The free-entry condition of a competitive market, however, implies
that potential profits for new entrants cannot be positive. Since
reputation q can be established by selling quality q at the entry
price p for one period, we must have
(5) p - c(q) + (l-e)V^(q)/(l+r) < 0.
e M —
Or, equivalently , an upper bound on p(q):
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(6) p(q) _< c(q) + [c(q)-p^](r+e)/(l-e),
which can be found after substitution from (3) into (5). We now argue
that
(7) p^ = c(q^)
which implies the coincidence of the lower and upper bounds of p(q).
First, note that p cannot be greater than c(q ), otherwise some
e
sellers will end up selling the minimal quality and making a profit.
Second, p < c(q,,) can be ruled out because no equilibrium entry
quality can exist in this case. The reason is that if entrants choose
a quality q, buyers of that quality soon learn that entrants sell
quality q at p < p(q). They thus stop buying from the established
e
sellers of q and go to the entrants only. But this in turn deters the
entrants from establishing reputation q. Therefore, no quality will
be able to serve as an entry quality. However, if p = c(q„), then
some entrants will sell at quality q and others at q , so that a risk
is created for the buyers of quality q who may be too optimistic about
the entry quality [4].
Given equation (7), inequalities (4) and (6) imply:
(8) p(q) = c(q) + [c(q)-c(qQ)](r+e)/(l-e),
which establishes the price-quality relationship faced by consumers.
Note that the last term on the right-hand-side of (8) is a profit that
sellers gain over the cost of production. This profit can be inter-
preted as the expected competitive return on the initial investment
-8-
that new entrants have to make in order to build up their reputation
—
i.e., c(q) - c(q ). This investment is a sunk cost for the seller and
its function is to correct for the information problems in the market.
Consumers, therefore, should be willing to pay the market rate of
return on it if they prefer guaranteed quality [5].
Consumers in this simple model are all identical, and each one
needs only one unit of the product under consideration. We define the
utility function of a typical consumer as U(u(q)+z), with U' > and
U" < 0. In this utility function, u( . ) measures the preference for
the quality of the product in terms of z which represents the aggre-
gate quantity of all other goods that the consumer buys. By defini-
tion u' > 0, but u" may be positive or negative depending on the
nature of preferences. If the consumer's income is y and the price of
z is normalized to unity, the utility function can be written as
U(u(q)+y-p(q) ). The price-quality relationship p(q) is taken as given
by the consumer and q is chosen such that the utility function is
maximized. The first-order condition is:
(9) 8U/3q = (u'-p')U' =0 => u' = ( l+r)c ' /( 1-e)
.
Note that on a p-q diagram, as in Figure 1, the family of consumer
indifference curves can be represented by k = u(q)-p+y, where k is an
indicator of the utility level. Obviously, as k rises, the indiffer-
ence curve shifts to the right and the consumer attains higher levels
of utility. Therefore, if an optimal quality such as q* < q exists,
m
it will be determined at the point where an indifference curve becomes
tangent to the price-quality relationship (8). Since the slope of the
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indif ference curves is u' , it is easy to see that this is exactly what
condition (9) requires. If, however, the solution to (9) turns out to
be larger than the maximum feasible quality, then q will prevail in
equilibrium, as depicted in Figure 2. Note that in general all points
on the optimal indifference curve, except the point of tangency, lie
below the price-quality schedule in the feasible range. Therefore,
sellers will not be able to establish and maintain a profitable repu-
tation at qualities other than q*.
The second-order condition for utility maximization requires
2 2
3 U/9q = (u"-p")U' < 0. Therefore, for the existence of an optimal
quality we must have:
(10) u" <_ (l+r)c'7(l-e).
Note that this condition will hold as long as u" is negative. How-
ever, it will also hold if u" is positive but relatively small. The
situation in Figure 1 depicts a case where u" is positive but less
than ( l+r)c"/( 1-e) . If, on the other hand, u" is positive and large,
(10) may be violated, and the equilibrium will be established only at
q (see Figure 2).
m
Conditions (9) and (10) indicate that with strong preference for
quality, i.e., large u' and u" , a sub-maximal quality, and especially
a low one, is more likely to exist only when the marginal cost of
quality is rapidly rising, the interest rate is high, and the seller
turnover is large. Note that these are the type of conditions that
are more likely to exist in markets with numerous small producers.
Small milk producers with one or two cows, for example, may easily go
-10-
out of business when they lose a cow, or sometimes, a family member.
Since such high turnover also tends to raise the cost of credit,
especially in the less developed economic environments, the above
model provides some explanation for part of the quality problems docu-
mented by Rashid (1985). However, this model does not explain con-
sumers' complaints about cheatings and the actual variability of
quality which seems to support such claims. Neither does it satisfac-
torily answer questions such as the one about the diluted milk sales in
some less developed economies. In fact, in the above model, consumers
can be confident about what they buy as long as they are willing to
pay for it. In the next section, we will argue that under uncertain
cost conditions it may be impossible to trust the sellers, since they
may find it profitable to lower their marketed qualities and risk
their reputations whenever costs tend to rise.
Before we leave this section, however, it is worthwhile to note
that the imposition of a minimum quality standard—which essentially
raises q —can improve the performance of the market. In our model,
due to the selected form of the utility function, the preferred market
quality, q* , will always remain the same, but the premium will decline
as the minimum standard rises. As Figure 3 shows, the minimum stan-
dard quality will be optimal at q* , and would only hurt the consumers
beyond this point. The question of optimal quality standards would of
course become more complicated if there are several distinct consumer
groups. Relaxing the assumption of identical consumers, as in Shapiro
(1983), does not change the essence of our results so far, since in
that case, each consumer group, with its different u(q) and y, will
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choose a different quality. However, now different groups may have
conflicting preferences over the choice of the standard. The task of
choosing an optimal minimum standard, thus, cannot be an easy one in
this case.
III. Cost Uncertainty and the Break Down of Quality Maintenance
The model developed above shows how reputation can help preferred
qualities prevail in markets with imperfect information. In such
markets, the possibility of losing the returns on the initial invest-
ment in reputation removes the incentives for cheating when producers
are certain about their cost and demand conditions. However, such
incentives may reappear if uncertainties exist at either end of the
firms' operations. For example, consider a situation where costs vary
randomly and independently for each seller. For simplicity assume
that the cost of producing one unit of quality q is equal to c(q) with
probability b, and equal to Ac(q) with probability 1-b, where A > 1.
In the context of our model, let us also assume that once sellers com-
mit their resources for production in a period, they cannot leave the
market; but they can learn about their cost situations at the begin-
ning of the period and then decide what quality to offer [6]. If, as
before, reputation is equal to the quality offered in the previous
period and each seller commits himself to a given quality, the
expected present value of reputation q can be found by the following
asset equation [7]:
(11) Vj^(q) = b[p(q)-c(q) + (l-e)V,_^(q)/(l +r)]
+ (I-b)[p(q)-Ac(q)+(l-e)V,_j(q)/(l + r):
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Or, solving for V (q) and setting b + (l-b)A = a,
M
(12) V„(q) = [p(q)-ac(q)](l+r)/(r+e).
M
Note that this result is essentially the same as (3), except that
ac(q)—i.e., the expected cost of producing quality q—has now re-
placed c(q). The free-entry condition in this case implies that
(13) p - ac(q) + (l-e)V^(q)/(l+r) < 0.
e M —
Given that the minimum expected cost for entrants is ac(q„), an argu-
ment identical to the one made in the previous section shows that we
must have p = ac(q ). Therefore, using (11), inequality (13), can be
solved for p(q) as:
(14) p(q) < ac(q) + a[c(q)-c(qj^)](r+e)/(l-e).
As in the certainty case, it is easy to show that if p(q) is
greater or equal to the upper bound set by (14), the seller of quality
q will not find it advantageous to decide to reduce the quality of his
product prior to the knowledge of his cost situation. However, now
the seller has another option: he can decide to reduce the quality if
costs turn out to be high. Our aim here is to show that under the
free-entry condition (14), this 'non-commitment' (N) strategy is more
profitable than the M-strategy.
Let us begin with the assessment of the expected present value of
a strategy which produces quality q when costs turn out to be low and
quality q when costs are high. The asset equation of such a strategy
can be written as:
-13-
(15) V„(q) = b[p(q)-c(q)+(l-e)V^,(q)/(H-r)] + (1-b) [p(q)-Ac(q- ) ;
N N U
Solving (15) for V (q) yields:
(16) V„(q) = [p(q)-ac(q)+(l-b)A(c(q)-c(q_))](l+r)/(l+r-b+be).
Now let us ask under what conditions V (q) > V (q). Comparison of
(12) and (16) shows that this will be the case if [8]
(17) p(q) < ac(q) + A[c(q)-c(qQ)](r+e)/(l-e).
But (17) will clearly hold as long as (14) holds, since A > a. There-
fore, with free entry, it will never pay for a seller to commit him-
self to a given quality prior to the resolution of his cost uncer-
tainty. In fact, the free-entry condition will dictate that
(18) b[Pg-c(q) + (l-e)Vj^(q)/(l+r)] + ( 1-b) [p^-Ac(qQ) ] <
which, after substitution for p and V (q), and some manipulation,
e N
yields [9] :
(19) p(q) < ac(qQ) + [c(q)-c(qQ)](l+r)/(l-e).
A seller with reputation q can of course sell quality a regard-
less of his cost situation and expect to earn V (q) = p(q) - ac(q„).
The condition that makes this strategy inferior to the N-rule can be
summarized as [10]:
(20) p(q) > ac(qQ) + [c(q)-c(qQ)](l+r)/(l-e).
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Therefore, for each quality there is only one price that satisfies
both conditions of free entry and of reputation maintenance in the low
cost periods. That is, in equilibrium,
(21) p(q) = acCq^) + [c(q)-c(qQ)](l+r)/(l-e).
When costs of a single seller rise, no price in a competitive market
can guarantee that he will maintain his quality. This result is
mainly due to the fact that there are other sellers whose costs remain
low and thus can continue to sell at competitive prices.
Given the price-quality relationship (21), the asset value of
reputation q can be found as:
(22) V„(q) = [c(q)-c(q-)](l+r)/(l-e)
N U
which is the cost of establishing reputation q under the favorable
conditions of a low cost outcome. This is indeed why V (q) here is
exactly the same as V (q) in case of certainty. Note that entrants
M
who find their costs high will not attempt to establish a high reputa-
tion. But entrants, or existing sellers, with low costs are indif-
ferent among various qualities, since they expect to earn a competi-
tive rate of return—that is, the market rate of return adjusted by
the risk of exogenous exit—on their investment. To see this point
more clearly, we may write (21) so as to make it comparable with (8):
(23) p(q) = [bc(q)+(l-b)Ac(qQ)] + [ c(q )-c( q^) ] [ r+e+( 1-b) ( 1 -e) ] / ( 1-e)
,
The first term on the right hand side of (23) is clearly the expected
cost of production, and the second term is the expected return on V,,(q).
N
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Given the uncertainty about the quality that each seller offers,
reputation in this context can be interpreted as the quality that a
seller will offer if his cost situation is favorable. Note that con-
sumers cannot excuse the sellers who offer q_ in one period as just
having hi£;h costs and expect them to produce a high quality in the
following period with the same probability that the established sellers
do. The reason is that such expectations are certain to be proven
inconsistent by the very incentives that they create for the sellers to
cheat even when their costs are low. Therefore, consumers can only
expect those sellers with reputation q to offer that quality with
probability b. Thus, their expected utilities can be represented by
bU(u(q)+y-p(q) )+( l-b)U(u(q )+y-p(q) ) , which should be maximized over
the price-quality alternatives that relation (21) offers. The first-
order condition is
(24) b(u'-p')UJ + (l-b)(-p')U2 =
where II and U are the derivatives of U(
.
) evaluated at u(q) + y - p(q)
and at u(q ) + y - p(q), respectively. Differentiation of (21) re-
sults in p' = ( l+r)c
' /( 1-e) , which can be substituted in (24) to find:
(25) u' = k(H-r)c'/(l-e),
where k = 1 + ( l-b)U ' /(bU ' ) . Comparing (25) and (9) and assuming that
the second-order conditions hold (see below), it is easy to see that
to the extent that k is greater than one, the equilibrium quality will
be lower in the presence of uncertainty. Note that two independent
factors may be at work here. First, the more frequent the cost
increases are, the larger (l-b)/b > is going to be and the higher k
-16-
will rise above one. Second, this effect is strengthened to the
extent that marginal utility declines with income, i.e., u! falls
short of U . The first effect is simply due to the fact that for any
given reputation the expected quality is going to be lower the more
often q is offered in place of q. The second effect, on the other
hand, is a result of "risk aversion" [11]. However, it is interesting
to note that k and, therefore, the equilibrium quality, is independent
of the magnitude of cost increase, A.
The second-order condition for consumer utility maximization can
be written as:
(26) S = bUj(u"-p") - (l-b)U2P" + b(u'-p')^uj + ( 1-b) (p* )^U2 <. 0.
The first term on the right-hand side of (26) is similar to what we
had in the case of certainty. However, now three more non-positive
terms are also trailing this condition and make its fulfillment all
the more probable. Note that as in the certainty case, the same fac-
tors that lower the preferred quality determined by (25), also help
make a sub-maximal outcome more probable.
If absolute risk aversion decreases with income, our model predicts
that markets with high income consumers will have a tendency to pro-
duce higher qualities. This can be easily shown by differentiating
(24) with respect to y.
(27) Sdq = [(l-b)p'U2-b(u'-p')U^]dy,
and by then substituting from (24)
-17-
(28) dq/dy = ( l-b)U2P' [U^/U^-uJ/uJ ]/S.
S in these expressions is defined by (26). According to (28), as long
as absolute risk aversion, -U"/U', is a declining function of income,
dq/dy will be positive. This result may help explain part of the
quality differences between similar products in developed and less
developed countries, in addition to the possible explanation provided
by the 'quality-is-a-luxury ' argument. However, our model has other
explanatory means for this phenomenon as well. In developed countries,
producers tend to be large-scale mechanized units with easy access to
efficient credit markets. Under these conditions, marginal costs tend
to rise more slowly, expected lives of firms are longer, cost of
credit is lower, and more importantly, cost variations are likely to
be smaller and less frequent. These are all ideal conditions that
help raise the average quality while reducing its variability. It is
interesting to note that quality problems similar to those in today's
less developed countries did exist in the past in the now developed
countries. But, as Rashid (1985) observes in cases such as the milk
market in the United States, these problems started to wither away as
markets became more concentrated, which is exactly what our analysis
suggests. This is not to say that no quality problems continue to
exist in developed countries, as it is not unusual to hear complaints
about automobile service in large cities. However, in developed
countries, the range of such markets is much more limited and the
enforcement of minimum quality standards is much more effective than
in developing countries.
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It is easy to see that minimum quality standards reduce the qual-
ity premium in this case, as they did in the case of certainty. A
minimum standard may also help raise equilibrium the market quality,
as differentiation of (24) with respect to q shows:
(29) dq/dq^ = (l-b)p'(q)u'(q^)U2/S > 0.
In the next section we will further argue that demand variations
may also give rise to the quality problems. Again producers in concen-
trated oligopolistic markets are less likely to experience demand varia-
tions than those in the highly competitive markets where each producer
serves only a few customers. The model thus helps explain the quality
puzzle in competitive markets and underlines the limitations of reputa-
tion in solving market failures in the presence of uncertainty and im-
perfect information. Furthermore, our analysis points to the roles of
technology, of market organization, and of efficiency in credit markets
as the sources of quality problems in competitive market. These are cer-
tainly important factors to be considered in the design of deregulation
and anti-trust policies, such as the ones towards the airline industry,
banking system, and telephone services in the U.S. in recent years. The
problems pointed out here obviously indicate possible flaws in the widely-
held premise of the unquestionable advantages of greater competition.
It is, finally, important to point out that the results obtained
above are by no means specific to the simple reputation function (1)
that we have used so far. For example, take the case of the more general
adaptive expectations R = yR
,
+ (l-Y)q ,, where Y "^ 1 is the repu-
t t-1 t-1 —
tation adjustment coefficient. It can be shown that the quality-
maintaining price in this case has to be:
-19-
(30) pCq) = ac(q) + a[ c(q)-c(qQ) ] (r+e)/ [ ( l-e)(l-Y) ]
.
However, the non-commitment strategy dominates the quality-maintenance
one at this price, and with free entry, the competitive price declines
to:
(31) p(q) = aciq^) + [c(q)-c(qQ)](l+r)/[(l-e)(l-Y)]
- [c(Yq+(l-Y)qQ)-c(qQ)]/(l-Y).
The asset value of reputation q in this case is
(32) V^(q) = [c(q)-c(q^)](l+r)/[(l-e)(l-Y)],
N (J
which is the cost of gradually building up reputation q under low cost
conditions. Note that if Y =0, (31) and (32) will reduce to (21) and
(22), respectively. On the other hand, as Y rises, the premium on
quality increases. That is, the longer the lag in the adjustment of
reputation, the larger has to be the investment in reputation and the
higher have to be the prices that guarantee that high qualities are
produced at all. Longer adjustment lags are often themselves a result
of noisy information received by consumers. For example, unless one
subjects milk to sophisticated tests, it is hard to detect its exact
composition. Thus, consumers may tend to discount a few "observations'
of a seller's product quality and wait for a while before they come up
with a verdict. In this respect, minimum quality standards and modern
measurement tools may help increase the amount of information and,
thus, reduce the premium on quality.
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IV. Demand Uncertainty and Further Generalizations
In this section we study the effects of demand uncertainty on the
choice of quality by monopolistic producers. We will show that as In
the case of cost uncertainty, quality-maintenance is not a dominant
strategy in the presence of demand uncertainty and that a non-
commitment one is likely to prevail. We will derive this result for a
monopolist seller first, and then discuss its Implications for a
market with monopolistic competitors. Also, the model is set up in a
more general framework to show that the main results of Section III
are not specific. In particular, since in this model the produced
quantity is endogenous, the exercise will help demonstrate that the
fixed-output assumption has not been crucial in our previous analysis.
Let us assume that a monopolist faces a stochastic inverse demand
curve Kp(R ,x ) where x is the quantity of output and K is a random
variable such that K = 1 with probability b and K = A > 1 with prob-
ability 1 - b. As in Section III, the seller learns about his demand
situation at the beginning of each period, and then makes a decision
about the quality and quantity that he wants to offer. For the
formation of reputation, we assume a general function of the form
R = R(q,q ,...), which can allow reputation to depend not only
on a moving average of the past quality record, but on its variability
as well [12].
Given the monopolist's initial reputation and the choice of
quality in period t, his maximum profits can be defined as :
(33) W(q^,R^,K) = max Kp(R^ ,x^)x^-C(q^ ,x^)
X
t
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where C(q ,x ) is the cost of producing x units with quality q . The
first-order condition for (33) is:
(34) K(3p/8x )x + Kp(R ,x ) - 9C/3x = 0.
This equation can in principle be solved for x as a function of R
,
q , and K. The second-order condition,
(35) T = KO^p/3^x^)Xj. + 2KOp/9x^) - 3^C/3^Xj. <_ 0,
is likely to hold as long as the second derivative of p( . ) with
respect to x is not a positive large number. If (35) is satisfied,
X will be larger the greater K is, since
(36) dx /dK = -[(3p/3x )x +p(R ,x )]/T = (3C/3x )/KT > 0.
Here we have first differentiated (34) and then used it to simplify
the relationship. Therefore, for a given quality, if an optimal level
of output exists, it will expand as the demand rises. In particular,
if the monopolist decides to market the same quality q in the first
period irrespective of the demand situation, we will denote his output
by X when K = 1, and by x when K = A. We know that x > x.
A A.
The monopolist's expected profits when he follows such a pre-
commitment strategy can be written as:
(37) V^^^'^i) = bW(q,R^,l) + ( l-b)W( q ,R^ ,A) + Vp(q,Q)
where V (q,Q) is the maximum expected present value of the monopo-
F
list's profits in the second period and thereafter, given the choice
of quality in the first period and the vector of qualities in the
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previous ones, Q. Choices of past qualities affect future earnings
only through reputation, which has been suppressed here without loss
of generality. To maximize V
,
q must now be chosen such that
M
(38) 8V /9q = b9W(q ,R, ,
1
)/3q + (l-b)9W(q ,R, ,A)/3q + 9V^/9q = 0.Ml 1 r
Now consider the present value of a non-commitment strategy
according to which quality in the first period should be changed by dq
if demand turns out to be low.
(39) V^(q,Rj) = bW(q,Rj,l)] + (l-b)W(q+dq ,R^ ,A)
+ bV^(q,0) + (l-b)V (q+dq,Q).
F ^
Expanding the terms with differentials and using (37) and (38) we
find:
(40) V (q,R ) = V^(q,R,) + ( 1-b) [ 9 W(q , R A)/9q , + 9V /3q]dq
N i M i i i r
= V„(q,R,) + (l-b)b[9W(q,R, ,A)/9q, - 9W( q , R, , 1 ) /9q ]dq.Mi 1 i i
But, by differentiating W(
.
) and using (34), it is easy to show that:
(41) 9W(q,R^,A)/9q-9W(q,R^,l)/9q = 9C(q,x)/9q - 9C(q,x^)/9q.
Therefore, since x > x, the sign of the coefficient of dq depends on
9
the sign of 9~C/9q9x. If the marginal cost of quality declines with
output, the coefficient of dq in (40) will be positive and the
monopolist will do better by raising the quality when demand booms.
On the other hand, if the marginal cost of quality rises with output,
the monopolist will find it profitable to lower his quality at the
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time of high demand. This last result is a reminder of the familiar
situations when some businesses with limited capacity tend to lower
the quality of their services when their demands are unusually high.
The above analysis would be essentially unchanged if we consider a
market with many monopolistic competitors. The main difference is
that now the demand function depends on the actions of other sellers.
In fact, a great deal of demand uncertainty for each seller in this
case may come from the independent activities of other sellers. For
instance, if quality production suffers from diseconomies of scale, an
increase in the demand for a seller induces him to lower his product
quality. This act lowers the reputation of this seller in the fol-
lowing periods and derives away some of his customers towards other
sellers who in turn may take this as a positive shock and respond by
quality deterioration. Thus, part of the demand variation in such a
monopolistical ly competitive market can be endogenous and will tend to
disappear as the firm sizes grow and as the market becomes more con-
centrated. It is interesting to note that diseconomies of scale in
quality production is more likely to exist in markets with numerous
small sellers, since economies of scale naturally help a few enter-
prises to grow and to dominate the market. Therefore, the tech-
nological factors that keep the producer sizes small may add to the
demand variability and create quality problems as well.
The application of the above technique to the case of cost uncer-
tainty is straightforward. The main point will be retained: quality
variation can be shown to be a rational response to demand or cost
uncertainties. Since such uncertainties are more likely exist in
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markets with numerous small producers, low and variable qualities also
tend to appear more often in markets with competitive characteristics.
V. Conclusion
The purpose of this study was to answer the question why low and
variable product qualities are mainly observed in markets with a
multiplicity of sellers and with free entry. This question turns into
a puzzle when one observes that such quality problems occur in markets
where uniform and high quality should normally be preferred by all
consumers; e.g., the milk market in some less developed countries.
Such problems may perhaps be more understandable in monopolistic
markets where sellers are in a position to exploit the buyers. In
competitive markets, however, even if there are informational dif-
ficulties, one expects institutions such as reputation to be able to
solve quality problems more easily.
In this paper, we have suggested that uncertainties that exist in
cost or demand functions of small producers may be the clue to the
above quality puzzle. Such uncertainties make the sellers' commitment
to a uniform quality unprofitable, and therefore encourage quality
variation. Consumers may of course be willing to pay higher prices
for higher qualities, but free-entry puts a ceiling on the price of
each quality such that sellers find it profitable to offer that qual-
ity only as long as their cost or demand situations remain favorable.
If, for example, costs of some sellers rise while those of others
remain low, the former will not find it worthwhile to maintain their
reputations. In this analysis, independence of cost shocks to indi-
vidual producers is a key part of the explanation for simultaneous
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price stability and quality variation in petti-seller markets. Cost
uncertainties may of course exist in oligopolistic markets as well,
but the frequent and independent shocks that strike small producers
are likely to average out for larger enterprises.
We have also found that quality problems can be exacerbated by
high and variable interest rates, rapidly rising marginal costs, and
short expected lives of firms; all of which tend to raise the costs of
production and of maintenance of higher qualities. These factor are
also often closely associated with competitive petti-seller markets,
particularly those of the less developed economies. The notorious
credit markets in such economies may especially be responsible for the
high and variable production costs and, therefore, for the low and
variable qualities.
Quality problems may also arise in monopolistically competitive
markets with uncertain demand. Again, the smaller and the more numer-
ous the sellers are , the greater would be the demand uncertainty of
each seller; especially the kind of uncertainty associated with the
inter-firm flow of buyers which normally averages out for larger enter-
prises in concentrated markets. We have also found that in monopo-
listically competitive markets where diseconomies of scale in quality
production are more likely, product quality tends to decline in re-
sponse to sudden surges of demand. This effect can induce a greater
turnover of buyers in such markets and, thus, exacerbate the quality
problem by increasing the demand fluctuations for individual sellers.
The same effect may also help explain serious quality problems in some
less developed countries where demand has experienced rapid growth
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rates. Some oil-exporting countries, and particularly the notorious
situation in Nigeria, are cases in point.
Finally, risk aversion in the face of uncertain quality is another
factor which may induce consumers to satisfy themselves with lower
qualities despite their strong preferences for the best; e.g., pure
milk. The poor may especially be hesitant to pay a high price for a
high quality and take the risk of ending up with a low one. This effect,
together with those mentioned above, go a long way towards explaining
certain quality problems in seemingly competitive markets. They also
provide a much better understanding of the quality differences between
similar markets in developed and less developed countries.
Minimum quality standards can reduce the above mentioned problems
significantly. But this solution is also more feasible when producers
are large and quality measurement and control is not costly. That is,
exactly when the market itself has a tendency to produce a high and
uniform quality. Such tendencies should certainly be taken into con-
sideration in regulation, deregulation, and anti-trust policy-makings.
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Notes
[1] Rashid (1985) does not discuss the variability of quality
explicitly, but it is certainly an integral part of quality
problem [see Bardhan and Kletzer (1984)]. Consumers get to know
higher quality products at times, but they learn not to keep
their hopes high all the time.
[2] The basic results of this section will not change if we use other
more general reputation functions (see Shapiro, 1983). An
example of such a generalization is considered at the end of Sec-
tion III.
[3J Because of free entry, the expected return on reputation qg is
the sane as the expected gain of a new entrant, i.e., zero.
[4] That is, the percentage of entrants with minimal quality, s, will
be such that consumers of quality q will be left indifferent
between existing and new sellers. In terms of the consumer
utility function that we are going to specify below, s is deter-
mined by
U[u(q)+y-p(q)] = sU [u(q^)+y-c(qQ) ] + ( 1-s )U [u(q )+y-c(qQ ) J
.
It is assumed that in equilibrium, buyers' expectations about the
probability of high quality among entrants is consistent. Note
that this argument is different from that of Shapiro (1983) who
assumes a continuum of consumers with at least one group that
prefers to buy the minimal quality at the going prices.
[5J Indeed, if they are sophisticated enough and know the cost struc-
ture, they may even refuse to purchase from sellers who charge a
lower price. Allen (1984) has used this idea to show that with
seller rationing, suboptimal production levels may raise the
average cost and replace the need for the initial investment.
However, examination of this point is beyond the scope of the
present paper.
[6] In the rice market, yields may vary and in the milk market, cows
may produce variable quantities at different times. The seller
then has to make a decision as to how much the product should be
diluted after he observes the quantity produced. Note that in
these examples quantity of the product is variable, while we have
assumed fixed quantity for each seller. The generalization of
the model in Section IV will show that variability of quantity
does not change the main point of this exercise.
17J Reputation in this case may depend not only on the past qualities
offerred, but also on the variability of quality in the past as
well. As we will argue in the next section, the essential
results of the model will survive even if we use a more general
reputation function of the form R^ = R(qt_^ ,qt:-2 > • • * ^ which nay
include the effect of quality variability.
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[8] Note that Vj^(q) > Vj^(q) can be written as:
(r+e)[p(q)-ac(q)+(l-b)A(c(q)-c(qQ))] > ( 1+r-b+be) [p(q)-ac(q) ]
.
Transferring (r+e) [p(q)-ac(q) ] from the left-hand side to the
right results in:
(r+e)(l-b)A[c(q)-c(qQ)] > (1-b+be-e) [p(q )-ac(q) ]
.
Now, factoring out (1-b) in the parentheses on the right-hand
side simplifies this relationship to:
(r+e)A[c(q)-c(qQ)] > (1-e) [p(q)-ac(q) ]
,
from which (17) easily follows.
[9] Note that (15) can be written as:
(15') V^(q)-[p(q)-p^] =
N e
b[Pg-c(q)+(l-e)Vj^(q)/(l+r)] + ( 1-b) [p^-Ac(qQ) ]
The expression on the right-hand side of (15') is the sam.e as the
one on the left-hand side of (18). Therefore, noting that
Pg = ac(qQ), we find:
(16') Vj^(q) < p(q) - ac(qQ).
Substitution from (16) yields:
[p(q)-ac(q)+(l-b)A(c(q)-c(qQ))](l+r)/( 1+r-b+be)
_< p(q) - ac(q ) = p(q) - ac(q) + a[ c(q)-c(qQ) ]
.
Multiplying both sides by (1+r-b+be) and moving some terms around
result in:
b(l-e)[p(q)-ac(q)] < [(l+r-b+be)a-(l+r)(l-b)A][c(q)-c(qp)]
which simplifies to (19) after a = b + (l-b)A is taken into
consideration.
[10] The proof of this result is very similar to the one given in
footnote [9].
[11] Producers in this model are assumed risk neutral, while consumers
may be risk averse. This asymmetric treatment can be removed by
examining the effects of risk aversion on the part of producers.
The result would be higher premiums and lower equilibrium
qualities.
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[12] Note that varying product quality over time may be part of the
monopolists optimal strategy (see Shapiro, 1982). However, in
this section, our main point is that demand uncertainty can be an
additional source of quality variation.
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